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IN THE COURT OF APPEALS
STATE OF UTAH
PROVO CITY,

Case No. 960168-CA

Plaintiff and Appellee
Category No. 2

vs.
SERGIO SALDANA,
Defendant and Appellant.

BRIEF OF PLAINTIFF-APPELLEE

STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION
Section 78-2a-3(2)(d) of the Utah Code confers upon the Utah Court of Appeals
jurisdiction in this matter. Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(d) (1953, as amended).
STATEMENT OF THE ISSUE
1.

Whether the evidence was sufficient to support the trial court'sfindingthat

Defendant was guilty of possession of a controlled substance.
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS.
STATUTES. ORDINANCES. AND RULES
1.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1995), adopted by Provo City Ordinances
§9.40.040.
(2)

Prohibited acts B~Penalties:
(a)
It is unlawful:

(I) for any person knowingly and intentionally to possess or use a
controlled substance, unless it was obtained under a valid prescription or
order, directlyfroma practitioner acting in the course of his professional
practice, or as otherwise authorized by this subsection;
2.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-4(2)(a)(iii)(N) (1994).
[Marijuana is a controlled substance].

3.

Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(27) (1994).
"Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual ownership, control, holding, retaining,
belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or
consumption, as distinguished from distribution, of controlled substances and includes
individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled substances. For a person to be a
possessor or user of a controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown to have
individually possessed, used, or controlled the substance, but is sufficient if it is shown that
he jointly participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any
substances with knowledge that the activity was occurring. [Emphasis added].
STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Provo City agrees with the Appellant's statement of the case.
STATEMENT OF THE PROCEEDINGS
Provo City agrees with the Appellant's statement of the proceedings.
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS
On December 1, 1994, Steven Johnson, a security guard at the Edge Dance Club in Provo

Utah, was working at the dance club. At about midnight, he was observing the patrons in the
basement area of the dancefloor.(T.T. 6). He noticed the smell of marijuana and looked around
to see where the smell may have been comingfrom.The dancefloorwas fairly crowded, but less
than 10 feet away he noticed a group offiveor six individuals huddled shoulder to shoulder
forming a semi-circle which faced a corner of the dancefloor.(T.T. 7). Mr. Johnson said that he
saw this group passing around some kind of cigarettefromperson to person. As Mr. Johnson
2

approached to within about two feet of this group of individuals the smell of marijuana became
stronger. (T.T. 8). Mr. Johnson testified that he saw the cigarette's general size and shape to be
short, two inches or less, and rather thin. Mr. Johnson then testified that he saw that they were
passing the cigarette around and demonstrated to the court the manner of passing and inhaling
that he saw. (T.T. 10-11). Mr. Johnson then grabbed two individuals, one that he had observed
just holding the cigarette after smoking it, and the other that had just received the cigarette and
had it in his hand. (T.T. 8, 19-20). Mr. Johnson made these observations for maybe five seconds
before grabbing these two individuals. (T.T. 11).
As Mr. Johnson grabbed the two individuals, he called on a walkie-talkie for other security
guards within the dance hall to assist him. (T.T. 10). As the two individuals, one of whom was the
Defendant-Saldana, were escorted to the back entrance, other security guards unsuccessfully
attempted to locate either the other suspects or the cigarette. The cigarette was not found on
either of the individuals so Mr. Johnson returned to look for the other suspects and the cigarette.
He was also unsuccessful and returned to the back entrance. Mr. Johnson testified that he did not
smell marijuana at any location in the dance hall with the exception of the original corner where he
grabbed the two individuals. The police were then called to the scene. (T.T. 11-13).
Within the estimated five minutes it took the police to arrive, Mr. Johnson testified that
the Defendant smelled very strongly of marijuana. The smell came from his clothes, and Mr.
Johnson had the Defendant breathe on him. The Defendant's breath smelled very strongly of
marijuana. In the better lit area of the back entrance, Mr. Johnson could see that the Defendant's
eyes were glazed over, bloodshot and that his pupils appeared dilated. Mr. Johnson testified that
the Defendant appeared nervous, as if he had been caught doing something that he should not
3

have been doing. (T.T. 12, 14).
Mr. Johnson testified that he was familiar with the odor of marijuana, that it is very
pungent, but also somewhat sweet-smelling. He testified that the smell of marijuana is
"very, very unlike that of typical cigarette smoke and is also unlike clove cigarette smoke or
anything like that." Mr. Johnson gained familiarity with marijuana through experiences growing
up as a young man aroundfriendsand at concerts. Although he testified that he was not trained to
detect marijuana on the street, he also testified that he had never to his knowledge mistaken the
smell of marijuana for other smells such as cigarette or clove smoke. Mr. Johnson also testified
that he is very familiar with the differences in which these substances are generally smoked,
including the use of various pipes, and self-rolled "joints" for marijuana use. (T.T. 5-6). Mr.
Johnson further testified that he had taken some classes at the University of Utah prior to the
incident which helped him to know the manner in which marijuana is used and abused. (T.T. 1718).
Officer Broberg was one of the police officers that responded to the call from the Edge
Dance Club security guards. Officer Broberg testified that the Defendant's clothes smelled
strongly of marijuana. Because of the strength of this smell Officer Broberg thought that the
Defendant had recently been around burnt marijuana. Officer Broberg then had the Defendant
breathe into the officer's nose. Again, Officer Broberg detected a strong smell of marijuana from
the Defendant's breath. He also observed that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes and acted
nervous. (T.T. 23-25). Officer Broberg testified that he was familiar with the smell of marijuana
and that he could differentiate the smell from other smells due to his training and experiences from
his job as a policeman. (T.T.24). Based upon his own observations of what he smelled and the
4

appearance of the Defendant as well as Mr. Johnson's observations, Officer Broberg felt that the
Defendant was in possession of marijuana. (T.T. 26).
The trial court found the Defendant guilty of possession of a controlled substance in
violation of section 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) of the Utah Code. (T.T.33). Defendant appealed.

SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The City established the crime of possession of a controlled substance by showing beyond
a reasonable doubt that the Defendant knowingly participated jointly with one or more persons in
the use, possession, or control of marijuana. The City further proved that the Defendant
individually either inhaled or held a controlled substance, that being marijuana. Real evidence, the
marijuana itself, is not required to meet the burden of proof. The City marshalled sufficient direct
and circumstantial evidence to prove that the substance possessed by the Defendant was
marijuana. While the Dolan factors are relevant to this inquiry, they are not an exhaustive list nor
are all of the Dolan factors required to find guilt beyond a reasonable doubt.
ARGUMENT

THE CITY PROVED BEYOND A REASONABLE DOUBT THAT
THE DEFENDANT POSSESSED MARIJUANA.
A. The Standard of Review.
On appeal, the Defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence supporting the
ultimate verdict. In reviewing this challenge, the "evidence and the reasonable inferences which
may be drawn therefrom" must be assessed in the light "most favorable" to the verdict. State v.
Pederson. 802 P.2d 1328, 1330 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Johnson, 774 P.2d 1141, 1147 (Utah
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1989). This court cannot set aside the trial court's decision unless 1) it was "clearly erroneous"
and "against the clear weight of evidence"; or 2) the court reaches " a definite andfirmconviction
that a mistake has been made." State v. Pelton. 801 P.2d 184 (Utah App. 1990); State v. Walker,
743 P.2d 191, 193 (Utah 1987).
When challenging thefindingsof fact of the trial court on appeal, the appellant must show
that thefindingsof fact were clearly erroneous. In order to show clear error, the appellant must
marshall all of the evidence in support of the trial court'sfindingsof fact and then demonstrate
that the evidence, including all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom, is insufficient to support
thefindingsagainst an attack. State v. Mooseman. 794 P.2d 474 (Utah 1991).
B. The City Proffered Direct And Circumstantial Evidence Which Proved Beyond A
Reasonable Doubt That The Defendant Possessed Marijuana.
To establish a prima facia case for possession of marijuana, the City must show beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant 1) "knowingly and intentionally," 2) "possessed a controlled
substance." Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-8(2)(a)(I) (1995). A person possesses marijuana by simply
inhaling it, holding it, or even jointly participating with one or more persons in its use, possession,
or control with knowledge that the activity was occurring. Utah Code Ann. § 58-37-2(27) (1994).
Black's Law Dictionary gives the following definition of direct evidence:
Evidence in the form of testimony from a witness who actually saw, heard or touched the
subject of interrogation. [Citation omitted]. Evidence which if believed proves existence of
a fact in issue without inference or presumption. [Citation omitted].
Mr. Johnson was an eye-witness to the events in question, his testimony providing direct
evidence in this case. The evidence that was available to the trial court regarding Mr. Johnson's
eye-witness account is as follows: He noticed the smell of marijuana and looked around to see
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where the smell may have been coming from. The dance floor was fairly crowded, but less than
ten feet away he noticed a group of five or six individuals huddled shoulder to shoulder and
forming a semi-circle facing a corner of the dance floor. (T.T. 7). Mr. Johnson said that he saw
them passing around some kind of cigarette from person to person. As Mr. Johnson approached
to within about two feet of this group of individuals the smell of marijuana became stronger. (T.T.
8). Mr. Johnson testified that he saw the cigarette's general size and shape to be short, two
inches or less, and rather thin. Mr. Johnson then testified that he saw that they were passing the
cigarette around and demonstrated to the court the manner of passing and inhaling that he saw.
(T.T. 10-11). Mr. Johnson then grabbed two individuals, one that he had observed just holding
the cigarette and the other that had just received the cigarette. (T.T. 8). He made these
observations for maybe five seconds before grabbing these two individuals, one of which was the
Defendant. (T.T. 11). Mr. Johnson testified that he wasfirmon his recollection that of the two
individuals that he grabbed one was the individual that he had actually seen smoking the cigarette
before passing to the other individual that had the cigarette-like substance in his hand. (T.T. 1920). Mr. Johnson testified that he did not smell marijuana at any location in the dance hall with
the exception of the original corner where he grabbed the two individuals. Mr. Johnson testified
that he was familiar with marijuana. Although he testified that he was not trained to detect
marijuana on the street, he also testified that he had never to his knowledge mistaken the smell of
marijuana for other smells such as cigarette or clove smoke. (T.T.5-6).
Officer Broberg's testimony corroborated the fact that Mr. Johnson had indeed smelled
marijuana. Officer Broberg also smelled recently burnt marijuana on the clothes of the Defendant
and on the Defendant's breath. (T.T. 22-24). The officer could differentiate the smell of marijuana
7

from other smells through his training and encountering marijuana weekly on his job. (T.T. 24).
Officer Broberg also observed that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes and appeared nervous.
(T.T. 25). If the foregoing testimony is believed it proves without inference that the substance in
Defendant's possession was marijuana.
Circumstantial evidence may establish the identity of a controlled substance beyond a
reasonable doubt. Provo City Corp. v. Spotts. 861 P.2d 437 (Utah App. 1993); United States v.
Sanchez DeFundora. 893 F.2d 1173 (10th Cir. 1990); United States v. Baggett 890 F.2d 1095
(10th Cir. 1989); United States v. Eakes. 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Dolan.
544 F.2d 1219 (4th Cir. 1976). Where the police have failed to seize and analyze the chemical
composition of the alleged narcotic substance, there must be enough circumstantial evidence to
support an inference that the defendant actually did possess the drugs in question. Baggett 890
F.2d at 1026. Whether evidence is direct or circumstantial is the subject of some confusion,
Spotts, 861 P.2d at 442, but even if the City's evidence is categorized as circumstantial rather
than direct, that circumstantial evidence established beyond a reasonable doubt that the substance
possessed by the Defendant was marijuana.
This Court has found that circumstantial evidence could be used to prove guilt beyond a
reasonable doubt "in drug cases where neither the substance nor expert chemical analysis is
provided." Id At 442; see also, United States v. Dolan. 544 F.2d 1219, 1221 (4th Cir. 1976);
United States v. Gregario. 497 F.2d 1253, 1263 (4th Cir.), cert, denied. 419 U.S. 1024 (1974).
In Spotts, the defendant parked in a vacant parking lot infrontof officer's unmarked patrol
vehicle. The officer observed defendant's windows were rolled up on a warm day and that the
defendant was taking "hits"froma small rolled cigarette. The officer then stopped the vehicle and
8

as the defendant opened the door the officer smelled marijuana emanatefromthe defendant's
mouth. Although the officer had difficulty explaining in verbal terms the specific differences
between the smell of tobacco and marijuana at trial, the officer stated that she did know and could
readily discern between the two aromas. As the defendant got out of his truck, the officer noticed
that the defendant's eyes were very bloodshot. While no marijuana was found, and any of the
facts standing alone would not likely have supported a conviction, the sum total of the evidence
was sufficient to describe rather unique hallmarks of marijuana usage and to uphold the
defendant's conviction of possession of marijuana.
Dolan holds that lay testimony and circumstantial evidence may be sufficient without the
introduction of expert chemical analysis, to establish the identity of a substance involved in a
narcotics transaction. Id, at 1221. In Dolan, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals held that in
establishing the identity of a controlled substance, relevant circumstantial proof may include:
l)uevidence of the physical appearance of the substance involved in the transaction"; 2) proof that
the substance "produced the expected effects when sampled by someone familiar with the illicit
drug"; 3) "evidence that the substance was used in the same manner as the illicit drug"; 4)
"testimony that a high price was paid in cash for the substance"; 5) "evidence that transactions
involving the substance were carried on with secrecy or deviousness"; and 6) "evidence that
defendant called the substance by name or others did so in the defendant's presence." Id, at 1221.
These factors were never intended to be an exhaustive list. The Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals arrived at the list by examining what factors had been deemed relevant in the past. The
Court cited several cases, only one of which relied on all six factors in determining the identity of
the substance in question. Unites States v. Gregario, 497 F.2d 1253, 1263 (4th Cir. 1974), cert.
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den'd.. 419 U.S. 1024 (1974); United States v. Ouesada. 512 F.2d 1043, 1045 (5th Cir. 1975),
cert, den'd. 423 U.S. 946 (1975); United States v. Lawson. 507 F.2d 433, 438-39 (7th Cir.
1974), cert, den'd. 420 U.S. 1004 (1975); United States v. Atkins, 473 F.2d 308, 314 (8th Cir.
1973), cert, den'd. 412 U.S. 931 (1973); United States v. FantuzzL 463 F.2d 683, 689 (2nd Cir.
1972); United States v. AguecL 310 F.2d 817, 828-29 (2nd Cir. 1962), cert, den'd. 372 U.S. 959
(1963); Toliverv. United States. 224 F.2d 742, 745 (9th Cir. 1955).
The Dolan opinion itself indicates that the list was not conjunctive. The defendant in
Dolan had been convicted of four counts of possession. The State had produced evidence of all
six factors for only one of the counts. Nevertheless, the Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals
determined that the evidence was sufficient for the jury to determine that the substance in question
was a narcotic. Dolan, 544 F.2d at 122-23. In United States v. Sanchez DeFundora. 893 F.2d
1173 (10th Cir. 1990), the 10th Circuit Court of Appeals adopted the six factors in Dolan for
establishing the identity of a controlled substance by circumstantial evidence stating: "The
government need not introduce scientific evidence to prove the identity of a substance. As long as
there is sufficient lay testimony or circumstantial evidencefromwhich a jury could find that a
substance was identified beyond a reasonable doubt, the lack of scientific evidence does not
warrant reversal." Id, at 1175. This Court has adopted the six factors given in Dolan. Spotts, 861
P.2d at 442. This Court found that the six factors were not intended to be an exhaustive list. Id,
at 442. This Court also found that circumstantial evidence did not require the proof of all six
factors to be substantial enough to prove guilt beyond a reasonable doubt. IdL, at 442.
In summary, the list of circumstantial proof listed in Dolan was not meant to be an
exhaustive list. Convictions for possession might stand on less than all six factors or on different
10

factors entirely. The only concrete requirement is that the circumstantial evidence offered prove
the identity of the substance beyond a reasonable doubt. Whether this burden is met is a decision
for the trial court, and as noted above, cannot be reversed on appeal unless clearly erroneous and
against the clear weight of the evidence.
In the case at bar, the City offered direct and circumstantial evidence establishing beyond a
reasonable doubt that the Defendant possessed marijuana. The instant case is very similar to the
evidence presented in Spotts. If the six factor Dolan test is applied to this case, the Defendant's
conviction should be upheld.
Thefirstfactor of the Dolan test is that there be evidence of the physical appearance of the
substance involved in the transaction. Dolan, 544 F.2d at 1221. At trial Mr. Johnson testified that
he noticed the smell of marijuana and looked around to see where the smell may have been
coming from. Mr. Johnson said that he saw a group of five or six individuals passing around some
kind of cigarette from person to person. As Mr. Johnson approached to within about two feet of
this group of individuals the smell of marijuana became stronger. (T.T. 8). He also testified that he
had never to his knowledge mistaken the smell of marijuana for other smells such as [tobacco]
cigarette or clove smoke. (T.T.5-6). Mr. Johnson testified that he saw the cigarette's general size
and shape to be short, two inches or less, and rather thin. There was both visual and olfactory
identification by a layperson experienced with the appearance and smell of marijuana.
This Court has upheld convictions based on lay testimony. In Layton City v. Noon, 736
P.2d 1035 (Utah App. 1987), a convenience store clerk observed a patron drive to and park in
front of the store. The clerk then observed the patron stumble as he entered the store, his speech
was slurred as he spoke to the clerk, and he smelled of alcohol. The clerk called the police who
11

arrested the patron for drunk driving, although he had never seen the patron driving. The officer
arrested the patron based on the clerk's information, and the smell of alcohol on the patron's
breath. Id, at 1037.
Unlike the lay witness in State v. Hutton. 502 P.2d 1037 (Wa. Ct. App. 1972) (lay witness
was unfamiliar with the drug and "heard" that it was "speed"), other courts have upheld
convictions based on lay testimony. These cases involve situations in which the layperson saw or
used the substance to identify the narcotic in question as the narcotic was never introduced at trial
or even seized at all. See e ^ , U.S. v. Brown, 887 F.2d 537 (5th Cir. 1989); U.S. v. Meeks. 857
F.2d 1201 (8th Cir. 1988); United States v. Schrock. 855 F.2d 327 (6th Cir. 1988); United States
v. Osgood, 794 F.2d 1087 (5th cir. 1986); United States v. Eakes. 783 F.2d 499 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Hunt. 794 F.2d 1095 (5th Cir. 1986); United States v. Scott. 725 F.2d 43 (1984);
United States v. Lawson. 507 F.2d 433 (7th Cir. 1974), cert, den'd, 420 U.S. 1004 (1975);
United States v. Gregario. 497 F.2d 1253 (1974).
Additionally, unlike Baggett, the 8th Circuit Court of Appeals upheld the conviction of
illegal drug distribution when the government did not seize the drugs, did not have direct evidence
that the defendant ever possessed them, and did not have witnesses who could identify the
contents of the boxes. United States v. Hill 589 F.2d 1344 (8th Cir.), cert, den'd, 442 U.S. 919
(1979). In Hill the government's evidence showed only "that the shipments were never returned
to [the manufacturer] for credit, that Hill volunteered to pick up the shipments and take care of
the matter, [and] that Hill did go to the customer's offices and take the pills (although there were
not always eyewitnesses)." Id, at 1349. The court held this evidence was sufficient to show
possession. The court further noted that "Hill's claim that none of the government witnesses
12

could identify the contents of any of the specific shipments as Statobex-D does not defeat the
reasonable inference of the evidence presented that the boxes did contain Statobex-D." Id, at
1350. In the instant case there is a witness, Mr. Johnson, who identified the drug olfactorily (an
observation corroborated by a trained police officer), and visually noted that the cigarette
appeared to be different than ordinary cigarettes. This witness linked these observations of
possession to the Defendant.
The second factor set out in Dolan is evidence that the substance produced the expected
effects when sampled by someone familiar with the illicit drug. Dolan, 544 F.2d at 1221. The
common form of ingestion of marijuana is by means of inhalation. Mr. Johnson testified that he
noticed the smell of marijuana and looked around to see where the smell may have been coming
from. As Mr. Johnson approached to within about two feet of this group of individuals the smell
of marijuana became stronger. (T.T. 8). Mr. Johnson testified that he was familiar with marijuana.
Mr. Johnson testified that he did not smell marijuana at any location in the dance hall with the
exception of the original corner where he grabbed the two individuals. Although he testified that
he was not trained to detect marijuana on the street, he also testified that he had never to his
knowledge mistaken the smell of marijuana for other smells such as cigarette or clove smoke.
(T.T.5-6). Mr. Johnson in effect sampled the marijuana by smelling it in the location where he
found the Defendant. He was familiar with the smell and could identify it. Officer Broberg, a
trained police officer, corroborated Mr. Johnson's testimony about the smell of marijuana by
identifying the smell on the Defendant as well. (T.T. 22-24).
In addition to Mr. Johnson and Officer Broberg recognizing the presence of marijuana by
recognizing its characteristic smell and smelling it on the Defendant, the Defendant himself
13

showed signs of recent marijuana usage. Mr. Johnson testified that in the better lit area of the
back entrance he could see that the Defendant's eyes were glazed over and bloodshot and that his
pupils appeared dilated. Mr. Johnson testified that the Defendant appeared nervous, as if he had
been caught doing something that he should not have been doing. (T.T. 12, 14). Officer Broberg
also observed that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes and acted nervous. (T.T. 23-25). These were
expected effects of someone who had sampled the illicit drug.
The third factor of the Dolan test is evidence that the substance was used in the same
manner as the illicit drug. Dolan. 544 F.2d at 122. At a distance of less than 10 feet from the
group, Mr. Johnson noticed a group of five or six individuals huddled shoulder to shoulder and
forming a semi-circle facing a corner of the dance floor. (T.T. 7). Mr. Johnson said that he saw
them passing around some kind of cigarettefromperson to person. (T.T. 8). Mr. Johnson then
testified that he saw that they were passing the cigarette around and demonstrated to the court the
manner of passing and inhaling that he saw. (T.T. 10-11). Mr. Johnson testified that he saw the
cigarette's general size and shape to be short, two inches or less, and rather thin. (T.T. 10).
Marijuana "cigarettes" are generally hand rolled and ingested by taking "hits" or deep inhalations.
Unlike tobacco cigarettes, these "cigarettes" are often shared among several people. This is the
conduct that Mr. Johnson observed. (T.T. 10-11).
The fourth factor of the Dolan test comprising testimony that a high price was paid in
cash for the substance does not apply to the case at bar as there was no distribution or exchange
for money involved in the facts.
Thefifthfactor in the Dolan test is that transactions involving the substance were carried
on with secrecy or deviousness. Dolan. 544 F.2d at 1221. Mr. Johnson testified that the dance
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floor was fairly dark and crowded in the basement, and the corner where the group was located
was even darker. (T.T. 9-10). He noticed a group of five or six individuals huddled shoulder to
shoulder and forming a semi-circle facing a corner of the dance floor. (T.T. 7). Other security
guards unsuccessfully attempted to locate either the other suspects or the cigarette after Mr.
Johnson grabbed the Defendant and the other individual. (T.T. 11-13). The fact that this group
huddled together facing a dark corner is evidence of secrecy as they were attempting to avoid the
public eye. The group apparently scattered after two of them were grabbed as the security guards
could not find them afterwards. These actions describe secrecy and deviousness.
The sixth and last factor given in Dolan is that there is evidence that the substance was
called by the name of the illegal narcotic by the defendant or others in his presence. Dolan, 544
F.2d at 1221. In the instant case there were no references adduced at trial to any statements made
by the Defendant. Thus, this last factor has no relevance to the facts as given.
The Defendant's conviction should be upheld because the direct and the circumstantial
evidence underlying it was sufficient to support the conviction. Mr. Johnson olfactorily identified
the marijuana cigarette and visually observed that the Defendant had either just inhaled or was
holding the cigarette. Mr. Johnson noted that the cigarette had a distinct appearance, unlike
regular cigarettes. Both Mr. Johnson and Officer Broberg smelled marijuana on the Defendant and
observed that the Defendant had bloodshot eyes and appeared nervous. The marijuana cigarette
was smoked in a dark corner and passed typically from one user to the next. The remaining
individuals fled once Mr. Johnson grabbed the individual that had just inhaled and the other that
had just received the cigarette. Any one of these facts standing alone would not support a
conviction. However, the foregoing facts taken together describe unique hallmarks of marijuana
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usage and possession. The Defendant used, possessed or controlled an illegal substance, by either
inhaling or holding a marijuana cigarette, thereby violating Utah Code Ann. § 5&-37-&(2)(a)(I)
(1995).
This court found that the six factor test given in Dolan was not intended to be an
exhaustive list, nor that proof of all six factors was required to prove guilt beyond a reasonable
doubt. Spotts, 861 P.2d at 442. The trial court correctly held that the totality of this evidence
proved beyond a reasonable doubt that the Defendant had been in possession of marijuana in
violation of Utah law. This holding was neither "clearly erroneous", nor against the clear weight
of the evidence, and therefore it must be affirmed on appeal.

CONCLUSION
For the foregoing reasons this Court should affirm the decision of the lower court, and
uphold the Defendant's conviction.
DATED this

;

^

Day of August, 1996.

Respectfully Submitted,

$__£*
Vernon F. (Rick) Romney
Attorney for the Plaintiff-Appellee
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Utah Code Annotated, §58-37-2(27)
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h - <iii) revoke, suspend, restrict, or place on probation
t the license;
(iv) issue a public or private reprimand to the
individual;
(v) issue a cease and desist order, and
(vi) impose a civil penalty of not more than $1,000
for each dispensed prescription regarding which the
j
- - 1 required information is not submitted., {
(b) Civil penalties assessed under Subsection (aXvi)
•M shall be deposited in the General Fund. • „ -M
u$t!.u (c) The procedure for determining a civil violation of
this subsection shall be in accordance with Section 58-1108, regarding adjudicative proceedings within the division.
(13) An individual who has submitted information to the
database in accordance with this section may not be held
civilly liable for having submitted the information.
(14) (a) All department and the division costs necessary to
establish and operate the database shall be funded by
{ appropriations from the General Fund.
- ^ . „ (W Funding for this section shall be appropriated witht • out the use of any resources within the Commerce Service
'
Fund. \
*
'
* (15) All coats associated with recording and submitting
data as required in this section shall be assumed by the
J
submitt&g drug bullet;
"
*\
IWS
58-37-8. Prohibited acts — Penalties.
* (1) Prohibited acts A — Penalties:' * (a) Except as authorized by this chapter, it is unlawful
' f for any person to lajowinjrly and intentionally;
]
* (i) produce, manufacture, or dispense, or to possess
with intent to produce, manufacture, or dispense, a
J controlled or counterfeit substance;
^ (ii) distribute a controlled or counterfeit substance,
or to agree, consent, offer, or arrange to distribute a
controlled or counterfeit substance;
>
~* (iii) possess a controlled substance in the course of
his business as a sales representative of a manufacturer or distributor of substances listed in Schedules
( II through V except that he may possess such controlled substances when they are prescribed to him by
a licensed practitioner; or
, >r Jiv) possess a controlled or counterfeit substance
„ with intent to distribute. v *~
*
\ , (b) Any person convicted of violating Subsection (lXa)
r
with respoct to:
' * t*
'hi ' u ( i ) a substance classified in Schedule I or II is
* > V * guilty of a second degree felony and upon a second or
^ ' subsequent conviction of Subsection (lXa) is guilty of
a first degree felony; r * *
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule III or IV, or
marijuana, is guilty of a third degree felony, and upon
a second or subsequent conviction punishable under
' this subsection is guilty of a second degree felony; or
'
(iii) a substance classified in Schedule V is guilty of
a class A misdemeanor and upon a second or subsequent conviction punishable under this subsection is
guilty of a third degree felony. *
(2) Prohibited acts B — Penalties:
(a) It is unlawful:
r
0) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess or use a controlled substance, unless it was
obtained under a valid prescription or order, directly
from a practitioner while acting in the course of his
professional practice, or as otherwise authorized by
this subsection;
(ii) for any owner, tenant, licensee, or person in
control of any building, room, tenement, vehicle, boat,
aircraft, or other place knowingly and intentionally to
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permit them to be occupied by persons unlawfully
possessing, using, or distributing controlled sub.
stances in any of those locations;
(iii) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
be present where controlled substances are being
used or possessed in violation of this chapter and the
use or possession is open, obvious, apparent, and not
concealed from those present; however, a person may
not be convicted under this subsection if the evidence
- shows that he did not use the substance himself or
advise, encourage, or assist anyone else to do so; any
incidence of prior unlawful use of controlled substances by the defendant may be admitted to rebut
this defense;
(iv) for any person knowingly and intentionally to
possess an altered or forged prescription or written
order for a controlled substance;
(v) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter
knowingly and intentionally to prescribe, administer,
or dispense a controlled substance to a juvenile,
without first obtaining the consent required in Section 78-14-5 of a parent, guardian, or person standing
in loco parentis of the juvenile except in cases of an
emergency; for purposes of this subsection, a juvenile
means a "child" as defined in Section 78-3a-2, and
"emergency" means any physical condition requiring
the administration of a controlled substance for immediate relief of pain or suffering;
(vi) for a practitioner licensed under this chapter
knovting)y and intentionally to prescribe or admuus' ter dosages of a controlled substance in excess of
medically recognized quantities necessary to treat
the ailment, malady, or condition of the ultimate user,
or k v* ,
n
*
* *
(vii) for any person to prescribe, administer, or
dispense any controlled substance to another person
knowing that the other person is using a false name,
address, or other personal information for the purpose tf securing the same. ' i f ' ^ *r
(b) Any person convicted of' violating Subsection
(2)(aXi) with respect to: « *
' •'
r (i) marijuana, if the amount is 100 pounds or more,
is guilty of a second degree felony;
»
(ii) a substance classified in Schedule I or II, or
marijuana, if the amount is more than 16 ounces, but
less than 100 pounds, is guilty of a third degree
u
felony; or
*'»"
(iii) marijuana, if the maryuana is hot in the form
of an extracted resin from any part of the plant, and
the amount is more than one ounce but less than 16
ounces, is guilty of a class A misdemeanor.
(c) Any person convicted of violating Subsection
(2)(aXi) while inside the exterior boundaries of property
occupied by any correctional facility as defined in Section
64-13-1 or any public jail or other place of confinement
shall be sentenced to a penalty one degree greater than
provided in Subsection (2Xb).
(d) Upon a second or subsequent conviction of possession of any controlled substance by a person previously
convicted under Subsection (2XW, that person shall be
sentenced to a one degree greater penalty than provided
in this subsection.
(e) Any person who violates Subsection (2)(aXi) wth
respect to all other controlled substances not included i&
Subsection (2XbXi), (ii), or (iii), including less than one
ounce of maryuana, is guilty of a class B misdemeanor.
Upon a second conviction for possession of a controlled
substance as provided in this subsection, the person n
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(3) Whenever'any substance is designated, rescheduled or
deleted as a controlled substance in schedules I, II, III, IV or
V of the federal Controlled Substances Act (Title II, RL.
91-613), as such schedules may be revised by Congressional
enactment or by administrative rule of the United States
Attorney General adopted pursuant to i 201 of that act, that
subsequent designation, rescheduling or deletion shall govern.
*5J V A

1 **

-b>

1979

68-87-4. Schedules of controlled substances — Schedules I through V — Findings required — Specific substances included in schedules.
(1) There are established five schedules of controlled substances known as Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V which shall
consist of substances listed in this section.
(2) Schedules I, II, III, IV, and V consist of the following
drugs or other substances by the official name, common or
usual name, chemical name, or brand name designated:
(a) Schedule I:
(i) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
mother schedule, any of the following opiates, includog their isomers, esters, ethers, Salter, and salts of
somers, esters, and ethers, when the existence of the
somers, esters, ethers, and salts is possible within
he specific
chemical designation: A
r
(A) Acetyl-alphamethylfentanyl;
(B) Acetylmethadol;
(C) Allylprodine;
(D) Alphacetylmethadol (except levo-alphacetylmethadol also known as alpha-acetylmethadol,
levomethadyl acetate, or LAAM);
(£) Alphameprodine;
<F) Alphamethadol; *• /
(G) Alpha-methiofentanyl; > *
(H) Alpha-methylfentanyl; r x ^ .k
(I) Benzethidine;
(J) Beta-hydroxy-3-methylfentanyl;
(K) Beta^hydroxyfentanyl;' ^ y
(L) Betacetylmethadol; ^
,
(M) Betameprodine;
v ^ , „
(N) Betamethadol;
(O) Betaprodine;
(P) Cathinone; t
, %
(Q) Clonitazene;
-.
'
(R) Dextromoramide; *^ j„- '
(S) Diampromide;
</ " *
(T) Diethylthiambutene;
T x
(U) Difenoxin; '. ^
~
(V) Dimenoxadol;"«' *r '
(W) Dimepheptanol;
(X) Dimethylthiambutene;
(Y) Dioxaphetyl butyrate;
(Z) Dipipanone;
(AA) Ethylmethylthiambutene;
(BB) Etonitazene;
(CC) Etoxeridine;
(DD) Furethidine;
(EE) Hydroxypethidine;
(FF) Ketobemidone;
(GG) Levomoramide;
(HH) Levophenacylmorphan;
(II) Methcathinone;
(JJ) Morpheridine;
(KK) Mppp (l-methyl-4-phenyl-4-propionoxpipiridine);
(LL) Noracymethadol;
(MM) Norlevorphanol;
(NN) Normethadone;
(00) Norpipanone;
(PP) Para-fluorofentanyl;
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*~ (QQ) PEPAP
(W-2-phenethyl^4-phenyl4.
acetoxypiperidine); *
(RR) Phenadoxone;
(SS) Phenampromide;
(TT) Phenomorphan;
(UU) Phenoperidine;
(W) Piritramide;
(WW) Proheptazine;
(XX) Properidine;
(YY) Propiram; *
(ZZ) Racemoramide;
(AAA) Thiofentanyl;
(BBB) Tilidine;
(CCC) Trimeperidine;
(DDD) 3-menthylthiofentanyl; and
(EEE) 3-methylfentanyl.
(ii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any of the following opium derivatives, their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers when
the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible
within the specific chemical designsx
tion:
* * v * * -i
\
(A) Acetorphine;
7 > *
(B) Acetyldihydrocodeine;
" »<
(C) Benzylmorphine; x ^ '
(D) Codeine methylbromide;
(E) Codeine-N-Oxide; *
(F) Cyprenorphine;
(G) Desomorphine;
(H) Dihydromorphine;
(I) Drotebanol;
(J) Etorphine (except hydrochloride salt);
(K> Heroin*/' - t »* *»»*•
(L) Hydromorphinol;,
- >
(M) Methyldesorphine;
^
(N) Methylhydromorphine;. « v
(0) Morphine methylbromide; ^
(P) Morphine methylsulfonate;
(Q) Morphine-N-Oxide; v ; «,
(R) Myrophine; .
.
,
(S) Nicocodeine;
(T) Nicomorphine;
^
/
(U) Normorphine; f
(V) Pholcodine; and
*n " (W) Thebacon.
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture,
or preparation which contains any quantity of the
following hallucinogenic substances, or which contains any of their salts, isomers, and salts of isomers
when the existence of the salts, isomers, and salts of
isomers is possible within the specific chemical designation; as used in this Subsection (hi) only, "isomer"
includes the optical, position, and geometric isomers
(A) 4-bromo-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine;
(B) 2,5-dimethoxyamphetamine;
(C) 3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine;
(D) 3,4-methylenedioxy methamphetamine
(MDMA);
(E) 5-methoxy-3,4-methylenedioxy amphetamine;
(F) 4-methoxyamphetamine;
(G) 3,4,5-trimethoxy amphetamine;
(H) Bufotenine;
(1) Diethyltryptamine;
(J) Dimethyltryptamine;
(K) 4-methyl-2,5-dimethoxy-amphetamine,
(L) Ibogaine;
(M) lysergic acid diethylamide;
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(N) Marijuana;
(0) Mescaline; •
(P) Parahexyl; - l
(Q) Peyote;
(R) N-ethyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;
(S) N-methyl-3-piperidyl benzilate;
(T) Psilocybin;
(U) Psilocyn; »
(V) Tetrahydrocannabinols;
(W) Ethylamine analog of phencyclidine;
(X) Pyrrolidine analog of phencyclidine;
(Y) l-l-(2-Thieny)Cyclohexyl Pyrrolidine; and
(Z) Thiophene analog of phencyclidine.
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material compound, mixture,
or preparation which contains any quantity of the
following substances having a depressant effect on
the central nervous system, including its salts, isomers, and salts of isomers when the existence of the
salts, isomers, and salts of isomers is possible within
the specula chemical designation:* - ; r >
s
(A) Mecloqualone; and s r*
(B) Methaqualone.* *>' J/*'***
(v) Any material, compound, mixture, or preparation containing any quantity of the following substances having -a stimulant'effect on the central
nervous system, including their salts, isomers, and
salts of isomers:
">• - t» \ *** *( }
(A) Fenethylhne;
\
(B) 4-Methylaminorex; and ^ '
(C) N-ethylamphetamine.^ - »*
(b) Schedulen: ' (it,**** tf***&n~l*
(i) Unless specifically excepted of unless listed in
another schedule, any of the' following substances
whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction
from substances of vegetable origin, or independently
by means of chemical synthesis, or by a combination
of extraction and chemical synthesis:
(A) Opium and opiate, and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of opium or
opiate, excluding apomorphine, dextrorphan,
nalbuphine, naloxone, and naltrexone, and their
respective salts, but including:
(I) Raw opium; *
(II) Opium extracts;
(III) Opium fluid extracts;
<• ^(IV) Powdered opium; - * » . . ,
* (V) Granulated opium; ^<
(VI) Tincture of opium; ""
(VII) Codeine;
(VIII) Ethylmorphine;
(DO Etorphine hydrochloride;
(X) Hydrocodone;
(XI) Hydromorphone; *
(XII) Metopon;
(XIII) Morphine; ~ s
(XIV) Oxycodone;
(XV) Oxymorphone; and *
(XVI) Thebaine;
(B) Any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation which is chemically equivalent or identical
with any of the substances referred to in Subsection (2Xb)(iXA), except that these substances
may not include the isoquinoline alkaloids of
opium;
(C) Opium poppy and poppy straw;
(D) Coca leaves and any salt, compound, derivative, or preparation of coca leaves, and any
salt, compound, derivative, or preparation which
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is chemically equivalent or identical with any of
.these substances, and includes cocaine, its isomers and salts of isomers, whether derived from
the coca plant or synthetically produced, except
the substances may not include decocainized coca
leaves or extraction of coca leaves, which extractions do not contain cocaine or ecgonine; and
(E) Concentrate of poppy straw, which means
the crude extract of poppy straw in either liquid,
* * solid, or powder form which tsontains the phen-*
w * . » ^anthrine alkaloids of the opium poppy.
' iii) Unless specifically excepted of unless listed in
another schedule, any of the following opiates, including their isomers, esters, ethers, salts, and salts of
isomers, esters, and ethers, when the existence of the
isomers, esters, ethers, and salts IB possible within
the specific chemical designation, except dextrorphan:
, \
,;
'
(A) Alphaprodine; ^
< -. * ^
. *(B) Alfentantf; ^ .wis. *'L-?r
y% \*s v(C) Anileridin^; *., y% M fc>M& v
^ U , M *~ w Bezitramide; rM * ^ ^ / ^ ^ j v
MV ^ „ * v ^ (J2) Bulk dextropropoxyphene^ (nondosage
forms); f*
„*, «• *.;""
(F) Carfentanil; > ,
(G) Dmydrocod>ine;:
(H) Diphenoxylate; fc h '« » (I) Fentanyl; * y.^».
*i^,r* , xt\ w (J), Isomethadone;^
** *
5r (K> Levomethorphan, _ ( ^ i n ^ ^ ,
(L) Levo-alphacetylmethadol" <r (some other
names: alpha-acetyhnethadol, levomethadyl ac*-* »* v etate,orLAAM);^v#*&Jfy$t?AAi*ti v
^ ,
J
(M) Levorphanol;/ ^iH^^X^%^
*• •* - t (N) Metazocine; Ste3*w*i&d£t4 J&jw 0 ,v
t ( 0 ) Methadone; ^.i >**{£&\(%xfr3jA
*
(P) Methadone-Intermediate^* 4-cyano-2-dimethylamino-4, 4-diphenyl butane;
(Q) Methyl-Fentanyl; * ^ i ^ * i
(R) Morainide-Intermediate, 2-methyl-3-morphohno-1,1-diphenylpropane-carboxylic acid;
(S) Pethidine (meperidine); 7Y
(T) Pethidme-Intermediate-A^
4-cyano-lmethyl-4-phenylpipendine; r^ ( s \
* (U) PeUudine-Intermediate-B, /M ethyl-4-phenylpiperidinQ-4-carboxylate; 'WM ^
(V) PetWdme-Intennediate-C,l-methyl-4phenylpiperidine-4-carboxylic acid;
(W) Phenazocine;-• xy ^ ll 'v*
(X) Puninodine; ;r *,« f V" £ «
(Y) Racemethorphan; * > *
(Z) Racemorphan; and
* >
(AA) Sufentanil.
»? .14 r*
(iii) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture,
or preparation which .contains any quantity of the
following substances having a stimulant effect on the
central nervous system:
* } ,'
(A) Amphetamine, its salts, optical isomers,
and salts of its optical isomers; ^ >
(B) Methamphetamine, its salts, isomers, and
1
salts of its isomers; 1
* ?/ * <C
b „ (C) Phenmetrazine and its salts; and
(D) Methylphenidate. '
H
(iv) Unless specifically excepted or unless listed in
another schedule, any material, compound, mixture,
or preparation which contains any quantity of the
following substances having a depressant effect on
the central nervous system, including its salts, iso. '
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58-37-1. Short title.
This act shall be known and may be cited as the "Utah
Controlled Substances Act "
mi
58-37-2. Definitions.
As used in this chapter
(1) "Administer" means the direct application of a controlled substance, whether by injection, inhalation, ingestion, or any other means, to the body of a patient or
research subject by
(a) a practitioner or, in his presence, by his authorized agent, or
(b) the patient or research subject at the direction
and in the presence of the practitioner
(2) "Agent" means an authorized person who acts on
behalf of or at the direction of a manufacturer, distributor,
or practitioner but does not include a common or contract
carrier, public warehouseman, or employee of any of
them
(3) "Control" means to add, remove, or change the
placement of a drug, substance, or immediate precursor
under Section 58-37-3
(4) "Controlled substance" m e a n s a drug, substance, or
immediate precursor included m Schedules I, II, III, IV, or
V of Section 58-37-4, and also includes a drug, substance,
or immediate precursor included m Schedules I, II, III, IV,
or V of the Federal Controlled Substances Act, Title II,
P L 91-513, as those schedules may be revised to add,
delete, or transfer substances from one schedule to another, whether by Congressional enactment or b> administrative rule of the United States Attorney General
adopted under Section 201 of t h a t act Controlled substance does not include distilled spirits, wine, or malt
beverages as those terms are defined or used in Title 32A,
regarding tobacco or food
(5) "Counterfeit substance" means
(a) any substance or container or labeling of any
substance t h a t without authorization bears the
trademark, trade name, or other identifying mark,
imprint, number device, or any likeness of them, of a
manufacturer, distributor, or dispenser other than
the person or persons who in fact manufactured
distributed, or dispensed the substance which false)v
purports to be a controlled substance distributed by,
an\ other manufacturer distributor or dispenser or
(b) an> substance that is represented to he a con
trolled substance
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(6) "Deliver" or "delivery" means the actual, constru
tive, or attemptad transfer of a controlled substance o- c
listed chemical, whether or not an agency relation^
exists
(7) "Department" means the Department of Comi^*- fr
(8) "Depressant or stimulant substance" means
(a) a drug which contains any quantity of
d) barbituric acid or any of the salts of baro
t u n c acid, or
(n) any derivative of barbituric acid which ha
been designated by the secretary as habit -forrmg under Section 502(d) of the Federal Fooc
Drug and Cosmetic Act, 21 U S C 352(d),
(b) a drug which contains any quantity of
d) amphetamine or any of its optical isomer
(lO any salt of amphetamine or any salt of aoptical isomer of amphetamine, or
(in) any substance which the Secreta^\ u
Health and H u m a n Services or the A t u m e
General of the United States after investigation
has found and by regulation designated haoi
forming because of its stimulant effect on the
central nervous system, or
(c) lysergic acid diethylamide, or
(d) any drug which contains any quantity of a
substance which the Secretary of Health and Humar
Services or the Attorney General of the United State*
after investigation has found to have, and by regula
tion designated as having, a potential for abuse
because of its depressant or stimulant effect on the
central nervous system or its hallucinogenic effect
(9) "Dispense" means the delivery of a controlled sub
stance by a pharmacist to an ultimate user pursuant to
the lawful order or prescription of a practitioner, anc
includes distributing to, leaving with, giving awa>, or
disposing of that substance as well as the packaging
labeling, or compounding necessary to prepare the sub
stance for delivery
(10) "Dispenser" means a pharmacist who dispenses a
controlled substance
(11) "Distribute" means to deliver other than by admin
istering or dispensing a controlled substance or a listed
chemical
(12) "Distributor" means a person who distributes con
trolled substances
(13) "Drug* means
(a) articles recognized m the official United State*
Pharmacopoeia, Official Homeopathic Pharmaco
poeia of the United States, or Official National For
mulary, or any supplement to any of them,
(b) articles intended for use in the diagnosis, cure
mitigation, treatment, or prevention of disease in
man or other animals,
(c) articles, other than food, intended to affect ^e
structure or function of m a n or other animals, and
(d) articles intended for use as a component of am
articles specified in Subsection (a), (b), or (c), but doe«
not include devices or their components, parts or
accessories
(14) "Drug dependent person" means any individua 1
who unlawfully and habitually uses any controlled sub
stance to endanger the public morals, health, safet> o r
welfare, or who is so dependent upon the use of controlled
substances as to have lost the power of self-control with
reference to his dependency
(15) 'Food" means
(a; any nutrient or substance of plant, mineral »r
animal origin other than a drug as specified in tm s
chapter and normally ingested by human beings and

199

OCCUPATIONS AND PROFESSIONS

(b) foods for special dietary uses as exist by reason
of a physical, physiological, pathological, or other
condition including but not limited to the conditions
of disease convalescence, pregnancy, lactation, aller^ hypersensitivity to food, underweight, and
o\erweighi, uses for supplying a particular dietary
need which exist by reason of age including but not
limited to the ages of infancy and childbirth, and also
uses for supplementing and for fortifying the ordinary or unusual diet with any vitamin, mineral, or
other dietary property for use of a food Any particular use of a food is a special dietary use regardless of
the nutritional purposes
(16) "Immediate precursor" means a substance which
the \ttorney General of the United States has found to be,
ana by regulation designated as being, the principal
corp pound used or produced primarily for use in the
Tianufacture of a controlled substance, or which is an
immediate chemical intermediary used or likely to be
used in the manufacture of a controlled substance, the
control of which is necessary to present, curtail, or limit
the manufacture of the controlled substance
(17) "Manufacture" means the production, preparation,
propagation, compounding, or processing of a controlled
substance, either directly or indirectly by extraction from
substances of natural origin, or independently by means
of chemical synthesis or by a combination of extraction
and chemical synthesis
/18) "Manufacturer" includes any person who packages, repackages, or labels any container of any controlled
substance, except pharmacists who dispense or compound
prescription orders for delivery to the ultimate consumer
(19) "Marijuana" means all species of the genus cannabis and all parts of the genus, whether growing or not, the
seeds of it, the resin extracted from any part of the plant,
and every compound, manufacture, salt, derivative, mixture, or preparation of the plant, its seeds, or resin The
term does not include the mature stalks of the plant, fiber
produced from the stalks, oil or cake made from the seeds
of the plant, any other compound, manufacture, salt,
derivative, mixture, or preparation of the mature stalks,
except the resin extracted from them, fiber, oil or cake, or
the sterilized seed of the plant which is incapable of
germination Any synthetic equivalents of the substances
contained in the plant cannabis sativa or any other
species of the genus cannabis which are chemically indistinguishable and pharmacologically active are also included
(20) "Money" means officially issued coin and currency
of the United States or any foreign country
(21) "Narcotic drug" means any of the following,
whether produced directly or indirectly by extraction from
substances of vegetable origin, or independently by means
of chemical synthesis, or by a combination of extraction
and chemical synthesis
(a) opium, coca leaves, and opiates,
(b) a compound, manufacture, salt, denvative, or
preparation of opium, coca leaves, or opiates,
(c) opium poppy and poppy straw, or
(d) a substance, and any compound, manufacture,
salt, derivative, or preparation of the substance,
which is chemically identical with any of the substances referred to in Subsection (a), (b), or (c), except
narcotic drug does not include decocainized coca
leaves or extracts of coca leaves which do not contain
cocaine or ecgonine
(22) "Negotiable instrument" means documents, containing an unconditional promise to pay a sum of money,
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which are legally transferable to another party by en
dorsement or delivery
(23) "Opiate" means any drug or other substance hav
ing an addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining liability
similar to morphine or being capable of conversion into a
drug having addiction-forming or addiction-sustaining
liability

(24; "Opium poppy" means the plant of the species
papaver somniferum L , except the seeds of the plant
(25) "Person" means any corporation, association, partnership, trust, other institution or entity or one or more
individuals
(26) "Poppy straw" means all parts, except the seeds, of
the opium poppy, after mowing
(27) "Possession" or "use" means the joint or individual
ownership, control, occupancy, holding, retaining, belonging, maintaining, or the application, inhalation, swallowing, injection, or consumption, as distinguished from
distnoution, of controlled substances and includes individual, joint, or group possession or use of controlled
substances For a person to be a possessor or user of a
controlled substance, it is not required that he be shown
to have individually possessed, used, or controlled the
substance, but it is sufficient if it is shown that he jointly
participated with one or more persons in the use, possession, or control of any substances with knowledge that the
activity was occurring
(28) "Practitioner" means a physician, dentist, veter>
inanan, pharmacist, scientific investigator, pharmacy,
hospital, or other person licensed, registered, or otherwise
permitted to distribute, dispense, conduct research with
respect to, administer, or use in teaching or chemical
analysis a controlled substance in the course of professional practice or research in this state
(29) "Prescribe" means to issue a prescription orally or
in writing
(30) "Prescription" means an order issued by a licensed
practitioner, in the course of that practitioner's professional practice, for a controlled substance, other drug, or
device which it dispenses or administers for use by a
patient or an animal The order may be issued by word of
mouth, wntten document, telephone, facsimile transmission, computer, or other electronic means of communication as defined by rule
(31) "Proceeds" means whatever is received when an
object is sold, exchanged, or otherwise disposed of
(32) "Production" means the manufacture, planting,
cultivation, growing, or harvesting of a controlled substance
(33) "Securities" means any stocks, bonds, notes, or
other evidences of debt or of property
(34) "State" means Utah
(35) "Ultimate user" means any person who lawfully
possesses a controlled substance for his own use, for the
use of a member of his household, or for administration to
an animal owned by him or a member of his household
1994

58-37-2.5. Restricted applicability.
This chapter does not restnct the sale and use of herbs,
herbal products, or food supplements that are not scheduled in
this chapter as controlled substances
1990
58-37-3.

S u b s t a n c e s w h i c h are c o n t r o l l e d — R e v i s e d

federal schedules govern.
(1) All controlled substances listed in Section 58-37-4 are
hereby controlled
(2) All controlled substances listed in the federal Controlled
Substances Act (Title II, i'L 91-513), as it is amended from
time to time are hereby controlled

